Nietzsche is often held to be an extreme sceptic about human agency, keen to debunk it along every dimension. He dismisses the ideas of freedom, autonomy and morality, we are told, and even the very existence of agents or selves. This book sets out the opposite view. Ridley argues that Nietzsche is committed to an 'expressivist' conception of agency, a conception that allows him to develop highly distinctive accounts not only of freedom, autonomy and morality, but also of selfhood. In the course of the argument, the text revisits a variety of central Nietzschean themes including self-creation, the sovereign individual, will to power, Kantian and Christian morality, and amor fati often to unexpected effect. The Nietzsche who emerges from thisbook has a clear, if demanding, conception of human agency and a robust commitment to the value of human excellence in all of its forms. This comprehensive study of Nietzsche and the expressivist conception of agency is important reading for all Nietzsche scholars and philosophers of action, but is also of more general interest to academics and students in philosophy.
