Acknowledgments.- Introduction.- Part 1. Wanting.- 1. The Question of Motivational Unity: Historical Preliminaries.- 1.1. Practical Mind: Aristotle's Question.- 1.2. Plato and the Tripartite Practical Mind.- 1.3. Aristotle and the Problems of Motivational Unity.- 1.4. Hobbes and Double Reductionism.-1.5. Hume and Hedonic Unity.-1.6 From Stevenson to Davidson: "Pro-Attitudes".- 2. Motivational States.- 2.1. Starting Point: The Things We Do.- 2.2. Behaviour.- 2.3. Motivation and Representation.- 2.4. Representational Match and Representational Mode.- 2.5. The Two Dimensions of Motivation.- 2.6. Excursus: Motivating Representations in Non-Human Animals.- 3. Wanting* and its Symptoms.- 3.1. Wanting*: Factoring out Believing and Fuelling.- 3.2. Symptoms of Wanting*.- 3.3. Symptomatic Definition.- 3.4. A Theory of Wanting*: Key Questions and Sketch of Some Answers.- 4. Expressive Explication and the Optative Mode.- 4.1. Moore's Paradox and the Idea of Expressive Explication.- 4.2. Optative and Assertoric Expression.- 4.3. Axiological Conceptions of Wanting*.- 4.4. Wants* as Mere Entailments.- 4.5. Appendix: Direction of Fit and the Internal Normativity of Attitudinising.- 5. Wanting*, Consciousness and Affect.- 5.1. Conscious Occurrentism.- 5.2. Not Really Wanting.- 5.3. Wanting* and Affect.- 5.4. End of Part I.- Part 2. Intending.- 6. Intention, Belief and Commitment.- 6.1. Introduction: The Irreducibility Thesis and the Role of Belief.- 6.2. Intention Expression.- 6.3. The Conceptual Marginality of Belief.- 6.4. Doxastic Symptoms of (Decisional).- 6.5. Summary: Postdecisional Commitment and Belief.- 7. The Intentional Syndrome: Characteristic Causal Features and Rational Requirements.- 7.1. Characteristic Causal Features: Dimensions of Intention Strength.- 7.2. Deontic Consequences: The Intention-Consequential Requirements.- 7.3. The Intentional Syndrome: Taking Stock.- 8. Deciding.- 8.1. Towards a Genetic Disjunctive Theory of Intention: The Itinerary of the Next Three Chapters.-8.2. Decision: Two Not Particularly Helpful Theories.- 8.3. Deciding and Judging.- 8.4. Minimal Inquiry and Judgement.- 8.5. Minimal Deliberation and Decision.- 8.6. Why Decisions are not Actions.- 8.7. Decisions as Deliberation-Terminative Optative Occurrences.- 9. Intentions Decisional and Nondecisional.- 9.1. Decisional Intentions.- 9.2. Five Ways to Nondecisionally Intend.- 9.3. Doxastic Conceptual Constraints.- 9.4. Being Set: Nondecisional Intention and Motivation.- 9.5. Nondecisional Intention and Conscious Wanting*.- 9.6. Leaving the Question Open.- 9.7. Intentions, Decisional and Nondecisional.- 10. The Intention-Consequential Requirements and Anchoring Attributability.- 10.1. Intention Noncognitivism and the IC Requirements.- 10.2. Bratman's Proposal: Self-Governance and Intention Holism.- 10.3. The IC Requirements, Self-Governance and Normative Functionalism.- 10.4. Anchoring Attributabilityght: normal; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold">.- 10.5. Taking Responsibility and Practical Rationality.- 10.6. Conclusion: Intention and Normative Culture.- Index.
